Para-Modern Family Therapy: Deconstructing Post-Modernism

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INTRODUCTION

In the 'systems' eighties, the field of family therapy divided epistemologically between first and second-order cybernetics (Mackinnon and James, 1987; Munro, 1987) or pragmatic versus aesthetic approaches (Falzer, 1986). In the 'constructivist' and 'constructionist' 1990s, the rupture falls between modernists who hold to a systemic/cybernetic paradigm and post-modernists who have moved on to a narrative/discourse metaphor (cf. McNamee and Gergen, 1992). Many family therapists caught up in such a paradigmatic watershed take a pragmatic third position outside this dichotomy. At the level of clinical practice and training, theoretical purity and consistency is sacrificed with both systemic and narrative approaches espoused.

This paper explores the modern/post-modern issue in family therapy from the perspective of Derrida's deconstructive philosophy. The modern cybernetic and the post-modern narrative metaphor co-exist in the deconstructive attitude.

After defining the modernist/post-modernist issue and noting a recent social-realist critique of post-modernism, deconstruction is introduced as a both/and logic which, like literature, disturbs but does not destroy binary-rational either/or thinking. From the deconstructive perspective, family therapy can be described as neither modern nor post-modern but both simultaneously, that is, para-modern. Other dualities in post-modern family therapy can be similarly deconstructed, for example, whether the self is a unitary essence or a socially constructed narrative. The paper will conclude with a discussion of some implications for family therapy practice.

POST-MODERNISM IN FAMILY THERAPY

There have been many references in the family therapy literature recently to paradigmatic shifts or moves from a modernist/systems model to post-modern metaphors of narrative and discourse. For example, Gooldishian and Anderson (1992, page 11) describe their "post-cybernetic" approach as, "based on intersubjective notions of social construction and hermeneutics as opposed to the subjectivist concepts of the constructivist and cognitive positions of second-order cybernetics". They suggest moving away from the latter, "to a position informed by hermeneutics, semantics and narrative..." (page 7). Similarly, Hoffman (1990, page 1) maps her "own move away from a cybernetic-biologic analogy towards social construction theory". Elsewhere, Fine and Turner (1991, page 807) talk of the "shift from first-order" to second order "post-structural orientations". Parry (1991, page 39) refers to "moving from a typically modernist", into a "uniquely post-modern therapy". Madigan and Law (1992, page 31) subtitle their paper "The shift from a modernist view of language to the post-modern analysis of discourse in family therapy" and so on.

Clearly, for these authors, the prefix, post, is ideologically prescriptive for the future of family therapy. Like post-modernists in general, they desire a radical break with the modernist philosophy that has informed Western culture since the Enlightenment (Best and Kellner, 1991). Modernism is the idea that autonomous subjects, through reason and the sciences, attain objective knowledge of a reality and discover lasting truths about the world. In family therapy, it manifests in a search for an essential theory of family functioning, such as the cybernetics/systems model, to guide the development of an expert therapeutic technology, as exemplified by structural, strategic and systemic approaches.

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1. As Goding (1992) says of famous family therapists: "In practice their therapy is much more eclectic" (page 23).
2. Italics throughout this section are mine.
Post-modernism answers the age-old questions of ontology (what ‘exists’?) and epistemology (what can subjects know?) by denying that a real world, ‘out there’, can be known objectively, outside our texts, language and social discourse about it. Post-modernists propose new practices and ways of thinking where notions of narrative, texts, discourse, the social construction of meaning, a decentered subject and the questioning of all meta-narratives are paramount (Rosenau, 1991; Best and Kellner, 1991).

Deconstruction and Post-Modernism

A by-product of the post-modernist enterprise in family therapy has been a misunderstanding of Derridean deconstruction. Many commentators generally subsume the latter under the post-modernist sign. The term “deconstruct” is often taken at face value to refer to the subverting of a text, story, belief or system of thought. For example, at the clinical level, White (1991a, 1991b) calls therapeutic practices which subvert people’s “dominant and impoverishing stories” and help to establish a sense of personal agency, “deconstructive”. Such practices include externalising conversations which “map the influence” of a problem and estrange or alienate people from “passengernood in life”. White (1991a) acknowledges that his approach is not strictly Derridean and can only loosely be called “deconstructive”. However, his use of the word derives from a common misconception of deconstructive activity by post-modernists, as an undoing or taking-apart of a text or narrative, followed by its reconstitution into an entirely new story or meaning.

Similarly, at the level of theory, for Kaye et al., (1992, page 80) a “deconstructive critique” of modernism involves a shift in epistemology, “from a notion of truth to notions of significance (or meaning). The implication is that for deconstructive philosophy, the old story of modernism is exposed, debunked and pushed aside in favour of a newer post-modern perspective. However, as Norris (1992a, 1992b) argues, Derrida’s work respects and preserves modernist notions of truth and knowledge and is not to be confused with post-modernist rhetoric.

DERRIDEAN DECONSTRUCTION

Here I would like briefly to illustrate not what deconstruction is, but how Derrida’s view of his work bears on the modern/post-modern question in family therapy. On my reading, Derrida (1988) deconstructs a text not to oppose or subvert it, but (like psychoanalysis) to reveal what it attempts to exclude and suppress, and to examine its conceptual and ideological schema. He does this out of curiosity and even love: “I love very much everything that I deconstruct in my own manner” (page 57). Deconstruction is not about opposing modern discourse, “but of ceaselessly analysing the whole conceptual machinery, and its interestedness” (Derrida, 1991b, page 109) that is, showing how its epistemology is used for political and ideological reasons (Wood, 1987). To deconstruct is momentarily to reverse (not permanently subvert a hierarchy and show how this reversal is already at play within the text (Silverman, 1989).

As Derrida (1992a, page 53) notes: “...the most radically deconstructive motifs are at work in ‘in’ what is called the Platonic, Cartesian, Kantian text”.

Although Derrida’s (1992a) work is a critique of modernity, he still remains within the tradition of modern philosophy. For example, he refers to himself (page 9), as one of the “heirs to the great philosopher of critique”, Immanuel Kant. In this regard, Melville (1986, page xxi) calls Derrida, “a profoundly modernist philosopher”. Here Derrida is both modern and post-modern, his work of deconstruction folds back on itself. It is this reflexivity which defines a crucial difference between Derridean deconstruction and the post-modern project, which Hoffman (1992, page 7) describes as, “dismantling the philosophical foundations of Western thought”. Here the post in post-modernism is uni-directional, privileging discursive or narrative modes of knowing. It opposes everything modern. Yet it is this very opposition or hierarchy in theory which Derrida proposes to deconstruct. Perhaps post-modernists confuse epistemology or knowledge with how it is used, that is, ethics. A discourse involves a totalising knowledge or hegemony, if it is imbued with power and turned into ideology (Eagleton, 1991). Modernists and post-modernists can equally succumb here.

Both modern/systemic and post-modern narrative discourses can be contaminated by the human need to mythologise, to say something Grand. This is a part of our metaphorical Western heritage which, like the narratives of the past, we cannot so easily escape. The constraint is not so much cybernetics (as Anderson and Goolishian (1992) suggest), but the binary thought of our culture in which the modern/post-modern debate is framed. This compels us to set up a hierarchy, to theorise, to oppose the true, real and knowable to meaning, language and the narrative.

Deconstruction as Literature

This is why Derrida (1992a) sees literature as deconstructive. It does not have an ideological agenda, offering only an absurd diversity that remains with human reason and knowledge, while reaching beyond to its outer limit. Literature does not talk in terms of this or that metaphor, but describes the “both/and” complexity of the world in all its ambiguity, uncertainty and paradox. As Kundera (1986, page 17) says, the art of the novel is to keep “the world of life under a permanent light”.

“What is literature?” was Derrida’s original deconstructive question (Bermiscon, 1992). For Derrida (1992c, page 328), deconstruction is “a certain experience of the impossible” as found in literary writing. Literature allows

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4. The question “what is deconstruction?” deconstructs itself, because deconstruction challenges the very logic behind “what is” type questions, the assumption of a singular essence or truth to be revealed.
5. There is a literary sense of tragedy and irony here, like Oedipus attempting to elude his fate. Like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, modernity is our creation and haunts us with its presence.
you to “say everything” without fear of censorship or contradiction. As such, literature is a “dangerous knowledge” (Harrison, 1991). It resists ideas of truth and truth and uses philosophical questions like “what is?” However, it still asks them accepting their necessity. Derrida (1992b) is interested in literary writing because it is in “life”.

A SOCIAL-REALIST CRITIQUE OF POST-MODERNISM

Like some feminist thinkers who consider issues of violence, power and gender as social realities (e.g. Lvi bond, 1989; Goldner et al., 1990; Goldner, 1993), social critical theorists have also challenged what they see as grand claims for a post-modernity disjunctive with modernism. For example, Norris (1992a) refers to post-modernism as a “widespread cultural malaise” characterized by scepticism, relativism and nihilism. The debunking of critical-realists notions like truth and ethics, in favour of a relativistic construction of the world through language and narrative, defines a “hyperreal” culture where films like Blade Runner are no longer science-fiction but “science-faction”. In a post-modern world which merges the fictive and the real, wars (as in the Gulf war) never really happen, except as a spectacle on television re-wound at the touch of a button. From Norris’s (1992a) critical-realist point of view, the idea that reality and power are co-constructed in a social-linguistic exchange of meaning, does not sit too well with the many victims of poverty, violence and abuse in today’s society. This echoes Minuchin’s (1991) recent comment that the social context of many families, such as El Salvadorans whose members have been “disappeared” by death squads, is real enough to them. To describe what happens in their lives as a co-constructed social narrative or story is misguided therapy. In the Australian context, the reality of forced removal of children from Aboriginal families (Brown and Larner, 1992) goes beyond the realm of the socially constructed narrative.

For Giddens (1991), the post-modern idea of self as “continuously revised biographical narratives” (page 5), that currently informs the social sciences, constitutes a late-modern desire for mastery and control of time and nature. The primary orientation of therapies on the narrative view of self is towards taking control of one’s life, as science has taken control of nature. This calls for a break with the past and any idea of a Time or fate which “carries us along” as in more traditional societies. A philosophy of uncertainty, risk and constant revision of self-narratives, generates a kind of futurology or “colonising” of the future. This contributes to a fragmentation of personal identity and a post-modern political-social regime devoid of the deeper moral questions of life and existence. For family therapy, Giddens’s (1991) theorising raises the spectre of post-modernist narrative approaches inadvertently extending the modern idea of conquering nature and time to the self.

Howe (1992) notes the glee of post-modernists in celebrating the death of the modern idea of self. He argues against Foucault (1973) that, in modern literature in particular, the idea of a true essential self has been liberating and revolutionary. The “idea of the self” came to form a social and moral claim. A claim for space, voice, identity” (page 253). For Howe (1992) it is still needed if we are to retain a sense of human value.

Best and Kelner (1992) suggest that modern systemic thinkers like Marx and Freud are needed more than ever to help understand the Big Story now gripping the world. The new stage of techno-capitalism which (through science, the media, the control of information, computers etc.) penetrates all facets of life (including therapy) is transforming all societies into one global commodity. Both modern and post-modern theories may be useful in resisting these perils of the present world age. Here the authors draw an important distinction between extreme post-modernists such as Baudrillard and Foucault who want a complete break with modernity, and those who are content to reconstruct modernism.

DECONSTRUCTING POST-MODERNISM

These theorists raise the question of how family therapists should approach the modern/post-modern issue. Should we adopt an “either/or” attitude and jettison anything to do with modernism and cybernetics or do we follow a meta-theoretical “both/and” position. Of course, this question itself cannot avoid being framed in terms of an “either/or” logic, just as the cybernetic versus post-cybernetic agenda set by post-modernists in family therapy is itself paradoxically typical of modernist binary rational thinking. Paradox and absurdity are difficult to escape, but perhaps we should question our desire to do so as it does seem characteristic of life, if not of theory.

As Lowe (1991, page 51) states, “the modern post-modern distinction contains unresolved tensions and paradoxes...”. Or as Rorty (1991, page 93) notes, something always sticks out of philosophies based on one true metaphor (cybernetic, narrative or whatever) and that “is usually the appearance of self-referential paradox”. Talk of shifts, moves, overthrowing paradigms etc. to chart a post-cybernetic push is curiously reminiscent of cybernetic terminology and a language of power. Here the post-modern claim, “There are no Grand Narratives” looks self-contradictory. Taken too seriously, a post-modern family therapy could unintentionally perpetrate the hegemony of theory in another guise, where post-modernism becomes another grand story to believe in after the purging of the old modernist tale.6

From this perspective, post-modernism could appear as an inverted modernism that perpetuates a philosophy of privilege where the fictive, narrative and the text are considered more real than the real. This simply turns the hierarchy between objective reality and the socially constructed narrative upside down, privileging language, meaning and discourse over the ‘real’ and the ‘true’. As

6. As in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, the danger is that one form of epistemological dominance replaces another.
the overse of modernism, post-modernism still operates within a binary logic and cannot be thought of as a break or rupture from modernism at all. For Derrida (1989), the narrative and the real are neither opposed nor collapsed into each other, but are suspended in a 'both/and' logic. Where modernists and post-modernists are led by binary thought to privilege one position or the other, deconstruction holds both 'in play' simultaneously.

PARA-MODERN FAMILY THERAPY
The deconstructive lesson for post-modernists in family therapy is that we cannot simply abandon modern ideas of truth and reality, just as we cannot shift or move beyond power and cybernetics. If we attempt to banish modern thought, it merely comes in by the back door (Derrida, 1992a). The desire to escape modernity may even take us deeper into it in a covert exchange of ideologies. Post-modernism is as liable as modernism is to arrogance, dogmatism and a conquering/dominating mentality, when it dismisses out of hand any conversation about an 'underlying reality'. The future challenge for a narrative approach is to find space for a notion of realism, despite the inconsistency.

Family therapy is deconstructive whenever it takes on a both/and view of its own theory and discourse. This occurs not pre-post a particular time or epoch, but is a surreptitious challenge to ideology (modernist or post-modernist) from within. To deconstruct the post-modernist story/narrative/discourse metaphor in family therapy is not to reject it, but to show how it cannot escape the clutches of modernity. In other words, we look for modernism in post-modernism and post-modernism in modernism. In a deconstructive attitude, all metaphors and approaches in family therapy co-exist in an absurd world of contradicting self-reflexivity:

In the absence of the One, what remains (reto) is not simply its binary opposite, the Many, but something far less certain — a scandalous absurdity” (Taylor, 1987, page 300).

Here the question “what is family therapy?” becomes not a forced choice between cybernetic or discursive theory. Rather family therapy encompasses both the modern and post-modern metaphor. It is not one or the other, but the movement between them, the articulation of their juxtaposition or relation to each other. This calls for a celebration of the difference between the two forms of discourse.

Real/Socially Constructed Selves
For example, take the post-modern idea in family therapy of the self as a socially constructed narrative: “Now in the post-modern era, the self ceases to be fundamentally coherent and instead becomes an endlessly transmutable social construction” (O’Hara, 1991, page 73). As Weingarten (1991, page 289) says, “We are as many potential selves as we are creative story tellers and makers”. However, in deconstructive philosophy, the real self as a modern subject is not abolished but put into question (Derrida, 1991b). The self is still centred even if it is “a centre that is always off centre” (Blanchot, 1986, page 390). The deconstruction of the subject is not nihilistic, but as a “subject-in-process” (Kristeva, 1986), the self struggles for identity and freedom. Deconstruction is interested in the interface between the modern and post-modern view of self. It doesn’t invert dualities like real/socially constructed selves but displaces them in a both/and logic.

Likewise, if modern ideas co-exist with post-modern, then the systems and structures we observe have a reality that cannot be reduced to their social construction in meaning. In de Shazer’s (1991) terminology, there are wet beds and talk about wet beds. There is reality and there is its social construction in language and narrative. This allows the possibility of a truth to discover as well as a truth to construct.

The Para-Modern
The foregoing suggests a deconstructive third term in the family therapy literature to express the play between binaries like the modern/post-modern. The prefix “para” forms compounds meaning both “beside” and “beyond”, e.g. paramedical, paranormal (The Australian Pocket Oxford Dictionary, 1984, page 490). The para-modern is both the modern and the post-modern. It is neither one nor the other, but both/and.

A para-modern stance may be already at play within the family therapy field. For example, Speed’s (1991, page 396) co-constructivism offers a para-modern reality that both exists ‘out there’ and is socially constructed: “…both ideas and reality contribute to knowledge”. Scheinberg (1992) and Weingarten (1991) join social constructionism with the social realism of feminism. Scheinberg (1992, page 202) states: “…I have learned to transform ‘either/or’ impasses into ‘both-and’ possibilities”. Flasask (1989, page 6) has explored psychoanalytic ideas within a systemic framework allowing both to “sit side-by-side”. Boscolo and Bertrand (1992) “have people tell genuinely new stories” and reconstruct their future narratives in the context of systemic therapy. Sluzki (1992) refers to “narrative-based systemic therapy” (page 229).

Family therapists invent, choose and mix contradictory images and metaphors (Lowe, 1990) for what they do, not because their discipline as a recent social science lacks theoretical rigour. Like literary authors and deconstructionists they are in touch with the both/and paradoxes of life which takes them beyond the either/or rational choices of theory.

A Play of Irony
We saw earlier how writing and literature don’t decide between truth and fiction, but articulate both in a double reading or meaning. Opposition or duality is suspended but present simultaneously. For Derrida (1992b, page 50), literature practices “an irony of detachment with regard to metaphysical belief or thesis, even when it apparently puts it forward”. This is why it is deconstructive.

Irony is the expression of meaning by use of words normally suggesting an opposite meaning. The word derives from the Greek “eironia” meaning “pretended ignorance” (Pocket Oxford Dictionary, page 367). The
“ironist” signifies unknowing in the sense of suspending a decision about the truth of a discourse. She/he has “radical and continuing doubts”, concerning the use of a final vocabulary, leaving it fragile, contingent and open to new terms and metaphors (Rorty, 1989, page 73). Vocabularies like “the cybernetic or narrative are ‘put forward’ as if true or final. Yet as language games (Wittgenstein, 1958) they are not to be taken as such. To be ironic is to be caught between vocabularies, believing in both their truth and non–truth. It is to be inside a discourse like family therapy while outside it.

For Bateson (1955), play had this ironic quality of doubtfulness, where “the messages or signals exchanged in play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant” (page 43). In the concept of play, there is a simultaneous suspension and presentation of meaning, a movement of irony that conveys one meaning or action while expressing its opposite. At one level, the family therapist thinks “this is family therapy” and applies a particular theory and method of choice, whether structural, strategic, solution-focused, psycho-analytic, systemic, narrative or conversation based. At the other level, there is the observation “this is not family therapy”, in the sense that the events that occur during and around a session cannot be encapsulated by this or that metaphor. Instead what happens in family therapy, like literature, “is in life”, ... in ‘real life” (Derrida, 1992b, page 56).

In effect, the para-modern family therapist adopts a playful stance towards the theory and discourse of family therapy, ‘putting forward’ a metaphor or technique with ironic detachment, not as an ideology. In a para-modern stance, we play at being family therapists from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside family therapy. Standing inside we believe in and respect the truth of a particular therapeutic metaphor, such as structural, strategic, systems, conversation, narrative etc. Standing outside the discourse of family therapy, we believe in the truth of no one particular metaphor at all, open to other possibilities that life presents to both our clients and ourselves. The conversation can then go on in a way that is not family therapy, which paradoxically opens up and enriches the vocabulary and discourse of family therapy itself.

An ironic-playful stance towards the theory and methods of family therapy offers a non-ideological space from which to chronicle events not usually defined as a part of therapy.

The para-modern family therapist suspends theory, technique and professional identity so as to look on what is usually called “family therapy” with a fresh perspective. The interest turns on what happens on the edge or boundary of family therapy, what is irregular, unheard of, unknown and buried in the footnotes of our experience. This suspending of orthodoxy to seize details that are usually passed over or marginalised defines deconstructive activity (Norris, 1987).

In a double irony, deconstruction takes family therapy back to Bateson’s (1955, page 49) comment at the dawn of cybernetic thought: “The resemblance between the process of therapy and the phenomenon of play is, in fact, profound”. Or as Winnicott (1971, page 36) said: “If the therapist cannot play, then he is not suitable for this work”.

CONCLUSION

In a double, deconstructive reading of the theory, texts and language in which dichotomies like the modern/post-modern are set, the para-modern family therapist engages and works out of all metaphors at once. The self is both a real subject and a socially constructed story. The family therapist’s knowledge and power to intervene in a session co-exists with a hermeneutic curiosity, patience and humility.

In a para-modern attitude, binaries like cybernetic/narrative and realism/social constructionism become part of the self-reflective dance of metaphor and language in the face of the known. Consequently the para-modern family therapist plays with a wide range of metaphors, whether narrative or cybernetic, modern or post-modern, none of which are True, but all of which co-exist in the mystery and fabric of life. As Tennyson (1913) put it:

All thoughts, all creeds, all dreams are true,
All visions wild and strange.

7. Such as “miracles”, where change occurs in response to an unusual coincidence of events, surrounding therapy and the family.

References

Preliminary Notice

Tenth Family Therapy Conference of Aotearoa

To be held in Auckland, New Zealand from Sunday 4th September, 1994 to Wednesday 7th September, 1994

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